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On Bureaucracy: Mises Versus Weber


When people think of government, specifically democratic government, they think of politicians or elected officials. They imagine representatives whose power is temporary and can be influenced by possibility of losing popular support and elections. However, “bureaucracy is the largest part of any government if measured by the number of people engaged or by fund expended” and is defined as “the totality of government offices or bureaus that constitute the permanent government of a state.” (Oszlak, 2005, 488-489) Elected officials and policy makers, for the most part, legislate or dictate goals, that ideally reflect the goals of the people they represent, but bureaucracy is the means through which those goals are pursued. The regulations, actions, and compulsion necessary to achieve the tasks and goals of policy makers emanate from bureaucracy. In other words, policy makers create an outline of action and bureaucracy is the source of the content and substance that is the state. Since bureaucracy is, by nature, “more permanent…than politician” it “makes the politician…more subject to bureaucracy” instead of the more common assumption of the bureaucracy being subject to the politician. (Anderson, 2004, 8-9) While the literature and theory on bureaucracy is disproportionately less, relative to its size and influence, compared to other components of the state, two major theorists have provided needed insight into this monumental, but intellectually neglected, institution: Max Weber, in “Economy and Society”, and Ludwig von Mises, in “Bureaucracy.”

Weber and Mises each approach bureaucracy from very different angles which, not coincidentally, leads them to starkly different observations and conclusions regarding the nature of bureaucracy and its impact on society. For Weber, his theories on bureaucracies are part of a “purely formal and typological discussion.” (Weber, 991) He describes the traits of the “ideal type” of bureaucracy as “arranged in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices;…compelled by the impersonal duties of their office; units and positions are arranged in a chain of command; …functions are clearly specified in writing, so there is specialization of task and a specified sphere of competence; and the bureaucrats behavior is subject to systematic control.” (Oszlak, 2005, 489) However, Weber focused much less on the cause of bureaucracies or the reasons they deviated from his ideal type, nor did he explain the axiomatic principles from which his ideal type was derived from. Instead he relies on historical relativism and a general institutional perspective that is biased towards “collective phenomena” as opposed to individual action in determining causal factors to describe bureaucracy, which he already accepts as both “inevitable” and “indestructible”, in abstractions of reality, whose generic nature and basis in flawed perception make the discovery of core “truths” impossible (Anderson, 2004, 6-9). Instead the observations are simply used as a means for predicting outcomes and do not attempt to answer “Why?”

Mises, on the other hand, relies on axiomatic principles to explain his theory of bureaucracy. The first principle is the “axiom of human action,” which can be described “simply as purposeful behavior” and is inherent to human beings “by virtue of their existence and their nature;” further human action “can be undertaken only by individual actors.” (Rothbard, 2004, 1-2) The second principle applicable here is the “Law of Marginal Utility,” which states that “things are valued as means in accordance with their ability to attain ends valued as more or less urgent.” (Rothbard, 2004, 21) For Mises, both bureaucratic action and non-bureaucratic action are undertaken by individuals with purpose toward some end, the difference, then, is that bureaucracy seeks ends without consideration for profit and non-bureaucratic institutions actions are profit driven. This concrete definition would apply to many if not all of the same institutions described by Weber and others as being a bureaucracy, but it also has the added advantage specificity and clearly separated categories to prevent overlap or contradictions in the conclusions that can be drawn from it. This definition applies to government, business, charity or any institution that takes actions without consideration for profit or to the degree in which their decisions are not made based on profit. In other words, the less an institution considers profit the more bureaucratic it becomes and vice versa.

In modern society not seeking “profit” is often viewed as altruistic or positive but this usually stems from a misunderstanding of “value” and the only way to translate “values” to “actors” providing goods or services to the public. As stated in the “Law of Marginal Utility” earlier, goods and services do not have inherent value but are only worth as much as the ends they to be used in attaining for according to the urgency of each individual. The only way for individuals, who all value things differently, to communicate these values to the producers of goods and services, so that capital resources are used efficiently to produce the most aggregate value, is monetarily or terms of exchange. This causes a problem for bureaucracies, as they do not consider profits, since they are not able to form computations of the value of the goods and services they provide and therefore, have to rely on the “guesses” of bureaucrats in the use of their resources, which will inevitably lead misallocation.

Both Weber and Mises viewed bureaucracy as destructive to society, Mises more definitively so. They both also foresaw the continued expansion of bureaucracy. Mises believed this expansion was due to the “interventionist”nature of State bureaucracy that forces institutions that were once profit seeking to adapt in order to “guard itself from destruction” by “incur[ring] all sorts of expenditures for matters not related to business” and act according to regulations imposed by government bureaucracy that force “production and consumption to develop along lines different from those prescribed by an unhampered market.” (Anderson, 2004, 12-14) The continued expansion of bureaucracy and regulations will reduce innovation and creativity, they will be replaced with compliance and obedience, and destroy the lines of communication between consumer and producer; as well as lead to massive waste through misallocation of resources.

Anderson, William P. (2004) Mises Versus Weber on Bureaucracy and Sociological Method. Journal of Libertarian Studies 18 (1) 1-29

Oszlak, Oscar. (2005). Regimes and Contention. In T.A. Janoski, A.M. Hicks, & M.A. Schwartz (Eds.), Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization (482-505). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Rothbard, Murray N. (2004) Man, Economy, and State with Power and Market. (Scholar’s ed.) Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute

Filed under Philosophy, Politics
Apr 13, 2011

Resources of Power: Fear, Love, and Dependency/ Machiavelli’s Prince and Modern Politics


Throughout chapters XV and XVII of “The Prince” by Machiavelli, it becomes apparent that power is the goal, to include increasing and maintaining power, as opposed to a means to achieve other goals.  Also, it is necessary to view “the prince” as power incarnate, so that what ever benefits the prince benefits the pursuit of power and vice versa.  This helps to make sense of troubling “principles” advocated by Machiavelli, such as the prince “need not make himself uneasy at incurring reproach for those vices without which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.”  (Machiavelli, Chptr. 15)  If power is the only true goal for the prince then it would follow that anything that advanced that goal would be virtuous and that other moral guidelines or cultural views would be moot, and adhering to them would, according to this view, be considered a vice to the degree that they detracted from the goal of increasing or maintaining power.  In chapter XVII of “The Prince”, Machiavelli continues with another principle, that should be troubling for those not in power, that it “is much safer to be feared than loved” since “men loving according to their own will and fearing according to that of the prince” it would be wise for a prince to “establish himself on that which is in his own control” and not rely on that which is in the control of others.  The only limit Machiavelli puts on the prince in regard to using fear to establish his is power, is to “avoid hatred” as that may make “the prince” intolerable and lead to his ouster.

Piven and Cloward, in their essay “Rule Making, Rule Breaking, and Power”, tend to classify power as a means to achieving and individual’s or group’s goals through a series of “zero-sum” contests.  They cite Max Weber’s definition: “power is understood as ‘the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action” (Janoski, 2005, 35) and that of R.H. Tawney: ( power may be defined as the capacity of an individual, or group of individual, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner which he desires, and to prevent his own conduct being modified in the manner in which he does not.” (Janoski, 2005, 35)  Their view of power posits that most, if not all, human interaction involves one dominant party who exploits the dependency of another party, or uses force as their source of power, in order to gain at their expense.  The authors seem to conclude, as a result of this view, that seeking power to exercise over those who have much few resources to exert influence through “social interdependence” is a vice, or social harm and that power should be diffused so that the degree that one party gains at the expense of another party is minimized as much as possible.  However, this is not to say that individuals or groups who did not wish to act socially responsible could not use Machiavelli’s principles to gain power and increase their exploiter status, it just is not the position advocated by Piven and Cloward.

When Machiavelli wrote “The Prince,” it was with monarchy in mind.  The advent of the modern state, new tools and resources of power have been developed and some of the principles found in “The Prince” have become outdated.  However, several tactics advocated by Machiavelli have been modified and carried over to the modern state.  One of the primary differences, though, is that politicians are not power incarnate since they are mere “caretakers” of the state and the expanse of its sovereignty.  Whereas the King was the state, politicians are seen as representatives, sent to enact their constituent’s wills through the state, or as employees of the state.  This “caretaker” position drastically reduces the incentive to seek “absolute power” or power as a goal in and of itself.  Since politicians are only temporarily in power and can not, necessarily, pass power that they gain to their heirs, they are more focused on using resources of power, or “political capital” accumulated by their predecessors or during their temporary terms to achieve more immediate goals that can increase their actual wealth or that of their heirs.  This divergence from the goal of “the Prince” will definitely have an impact on the strategies they pursue, as they will be more short term and consist of utilizing, or spending power, as opposed to building and maintaining it.

The state, itself, is seen as a more ambiguous and anonymous phenomenon that is supposedly created by the “collective consciousness” or “general will” of the people.  However, as Austrian economist, Ludwig von Mises wrote in his book, “Socialism:”

“All rational action is in the first place individual action. Only the individual thinks. Only the individual reasons. Only the individual acts.”
The modern state has achieved the illusion of dichotomy, being divided into one part consisting of some metaphysical representation of the “general will,” the State, and the other of individuals in the employ of the State , and thus theoretically subordinated to the “general will,” politicians and the bureaucracy.  However, as with anything supernatural or based on superstition, closer examination reveals that there is no real evidence of its existence, no actions that can be directly attributed to it, without use of its supposed proxies, no boundaries the demarcate where its existence begins or ends, or any other measure of reality that can be applied to it.  Instead, objective observation, reveals that the masses are still subjected to the coercive power held by a few elite individuals, who when the curtains are pulled back, like in the Wizard of Oz, are normal men acting in their own self-interest.

This illusion of a dichotomous state allows politicians and the bureaucracy to more easily achieve the ideal means to power, according to Machiavelli, fear and love simultaneously.  The ruling elite, presenting themselves as representatives of the masses, can gain the love of the people by advocating for favors on their behalf, while their losses and necessary fear can be attributed to the State.  This phenomenon is apparent in most polls where the American Public, usually, approves of their own Congressman but holds Congress itself in the lowest regard.  They view the system as working against them, and every favor achieved by their representative as being wrestled from the tight jaws of the fearful State on their behalf.  If the public ever realized that the individuals and the State are one and the same the illusion would crumble.

The members of the State are also to achieve both love and fear through dependency, or the threat of withdrawing “love.”  Authoritarian parenting uses this technique to control children.  Children are made to believe that their parents’ love is conditional and can be lost if they do or do not act a certain way.  This method of control tends to be more effective at controlling behavior than fear of corporal punishment or overt reward/punishment schemes.  The State has realized the potential of utilizing this technique on its populations and so attempts to increase dependency and remove competitors of services it provides so that the threat of losing government services has that much more impact on controlling its citizens.  This also fits with Piven and Cloward’s theory of interdependence as a power resource, where the State attempts to raise the dependence of other parties while at the same time reducing its dependence on them so that it can more effectively exploit them with little resistance.

The reason for all the manipulation and illusion to maintain and increase power is because the ruling elite realize that their power truly comes from the people they rule and the legitimacy they grant them and that if the masses realized this, if they are not controlled by sufficient fear or love of the current power holders, they could take that power back at any time.  French philosopher, Etienne de la Boetie, in “The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude”, explained it best:

He who thus domineers over [you]…has indeed nothing more than the power that you confer upon him to destroy you. Where has he acquired enough eyes to spy upon you, if you do not provide them yourselves?  How can he have so many arms to beat you with, if he does not borrow them from you?  The feet that trample down your cities, where does he get them if they are not your own?  How does he have any power over you except through you? How would he dare assail you if had no cooperation from you?… weaken yourselves in order to make him the stronger and mightier to hold you in check. (1975, 52)

While Machiavelli’s principles may have been meant for monarchs, the techniques chosen by the modern holders of power should be no less unsettling and if Piven and Cloward are correct that the exercise of power leads to “zero-sum” contests with one party as the exploiter and the other the exploited, then we should recognize that the State is, or strives to be, always the exploiter and we should not give it a pass or make an exception for it in our agreed upon principles and ideas.

Works Cited:
Boetie, E. (1975). The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude. New York: Free Life Editions.
Machiavelli, N. (1916). The Prince. The Macmillan Company.
Mises, L. (1982). Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund Inc.
Piven,F.F., & Cloward, R.A. (2005). Rule Making, Rule Breaking, and Power. In T.A. Janoski, A.M. Hicks, & M.A. Schwartz (Eds.), Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization (33-53). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Filed under Philosophy, Politics
Apr 2, 2011