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Demystifying Democracy: A Critical Look at Democracy and Ideology

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Throughout history the many have always been ruled by the elite few. David Hume, in The First Principles of Government, highlights this fact as one of the great philosophical mysteries since “Force is always on the side of the governed,” and finds that it is “on opinion only that government is founded, and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and popular.” (Hume, 19) The opinion that Hume refers to relies on ideology and it certainly applies to today’s most popular form of governance, democracy. Democracy has become the means for the elite to maintain power over the masses after the individualistic and natural rights philosophies delegitimized other previously common forms of governance such as monarchy; further, democracy has transcended its original role as a possible means to individual liberty and has become an ideological end and has been made sacred to the point that it is beyond debate in the minds of many. However, democracy must be objectively judged against the goals of promoting and securing individual liberty in order to make the most informed decisions in regards to foreign policy, such as the benefit of “spreading democracy,” as well as domestic policy where individual rights are most affected.

A clear definition of ideology, as it is used here, must be established in order to effectively communicate the nature of its relationship to democracy and power in general. The common usage of the term, a system of beliefs and values, is too vague and simple to fit this purpose. Robert Higgs, in Crisis and Leviathan, defines ideology this way: “ideology…[is] a somewhat coherent, rather comprehensive belief system about social relations…it is somewhat coherent…though not necessarily in a way that would satisfy a logician…it is rather comprehensive [since] it subsumes a wide variety of social categories and their interrelations…[However,] it tends to revolve about only a few central values—for instance, individual freedom, social equality, or national glory.” (Higgs, 37) This definition does describe ideology but is lacking a component necessary to explain why its variants, such as ideological (which usually implies fanaticism), usually carry a negative connotation or to fully explain why “ideologies are the crucial lever at the disposal of elites for obtaining political mobilization and for maximizing the possibilities of mass manipulation,” (Higgs, 47) that Higgs alludes to later in his book. In order to complete Higgs definition it is necessary to require individuals to subordinate themselves to their chosen ideology. This subordination of the individual is what can lead to fanaticism, which is why fanatics do not appear to be acting in their “own best interests,” and it complements Hume’s answer as to how the elite few rule the masses: the masses have subordinated their own interests to an ideology that legitimizes the current form of power held by the elite. In Western Political Though: From Socrates to the Age of Ideology, Brian Nelson writes, “ Ideologies…tend to replace the idea of personal autonomy with a higher principle of moral progress beyond the individual, a principle to which the individual is to subordinate him- or herself…ideologies tend to subordinate the individual’s moral agency rather than actualize it. (Nelson, 360) In sum, ideology is a coherent, comprehensive belief system that subordinates personal moral autonomy to some higher principle(s) that the belief system revolves around. Another implication of this definition of ideology is that the source of the belief system is external to the individual adherents and the evolution of ideologies ensures that only a limited number that attracts large numbers of adherents tend to survive or have influence. Higgs explained that “opinion leaders are the producers and distributors of (a limited number of) ideologies; the masses are mainly consumers.” (Higgs, 45) The potential for mass manipulation by the opinion leaders should be apparent and if those opinion leaders are also the ruling class with a monopoly over coercive force then their potential threat to individual liberty is exponentially greater.

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Oct 7, 2012

American Government: True or Perverse According to Aristotle?

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Its been over 2000 years since Aristotle provided his insights into all areas of philosophy, including politics, and yet many of his observations are still useful today. One concept that still has value is that of “true forms of government” and perversions of those forms. Aristotle explained that “true forms of government…are those in which the one, or the few, or the many , govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are perversions.” (Tilly, 2005:424). He also provided three examples of true forms of government and their perverse forms: Monarchy is the rule of one for the common good and tyranny is the perverse form where the king or dictator seeks his own interest to the detriment to the common interests; Aristocracy is the rule of rich benefactors of society while oligarchy is rule by rich exploiters of their lessers; the final example is Constitutional government is the rule of the masses through established law, again for the common good and the perversion, according to Aristotle, is democracy where the masses live parasitic lives exploiting the rich whom they outnumber and replacing established law with arbitrary decrees. (Tilly, 2005: 424) Another category not included by Aristotle that follow the rule by one, few, or many and perversion based on pursuit of common or contra common interests could be voluntary society, the rule by none with members seeking the mutual benefit of one another through market based exchange, and its perversion lawlessness, a dog eat dog world where each member seeks to gain through the coercion of his neighbors. Even with this fourth category this form of categorization is to simple to capture all of the complexities and subtleties of government types, mechanisms, and their various perversions, nor does it seem to recognize the various degrees of perversion between the “true form” and the perverse form. Also, it does not address the major controversy of discerning what is in the “common interest” or who decides what is in the common interest. There are very few, if any, issues that will have unanimous agreement and so each decision pursuing one goal over another will be against some part of the common, and yet they will be obliged to follow regardless due to the nature of the state as being a monopoly of coercive power over the geographic area they reside in.

When applying these categories to modern American government, it is necessary to create another category not mentioned earlier. Aristotle mainly addressed government of direct rule, either by one, few, or many, but America is not ruled directly but through representatives. The power holders are not in the polity, per se, but use proxies to exercise their will. The true form of this government would be representative constitutional government, where the representatives act in the, so called, common interest within strict limits of established law and the perversion is corporatism, where the representatives’ actions are detrimental to the public in order to gain favor or wealth from organized interest groups or from wealthy individuals or businesses. Currently, it would seem that American government is closest to this perverse form, corporatism. The masses have very little political participation, usually limited to a portion voting once every 2-4 years, with not further recourse or actions available to them for the remaining duration of time. However, organized interest groups and wealthy members are able to lobby and influence the polity at will and they find ways to use state coercion against the masses and each other to gain a perceived advantage, as opposed to seeking mutually beneficial means to achieve advantage, though perhaps slower or lesser than what is possible to achieve by exploiting others through the state.

The very nature of any state is to move towards its perverse form of government. All of the precautions taken during its formation such as federalism, written constitution, division of powers, etc. are simply recognition of this natural degradation and are meant to act as resistance to slow the inevitable process. The only way for this process to be “reset” is for the government to become intolerable to the people, causing them to revolt and re-establish a new state so that the process can begin again. This again was recognized in the formation of the United States, Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence, “whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government…” The only possible category that can avoid this cycle is that of the voluntary society. So long as all individuals are able to leave and/or form new government-like institutions, then each institution will be forced to act in the common interest since its members will leave, since there is no monopoly or arbitrary exertion of coercion based on geographic boundaries, if the perceived costs of being a “citizen” or member of that institution ever exceed the benefits. All members will be voluntary and their consent to the authority of their chosen institution will be explicit, as opposed to the “implied consent” that existing governments claim to have.

 

Tilly, C. (2005). Regimes and Contention. In T.A. Janoski, A.M. Hicks, & M.A. Schwartz (Eds.), Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization (423-440). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Its been over 2000 years since Aristotle provided his insights into all areas of philosophy, including politics, and yet many of his observations are still useful today. One concept that still has value is that of “true forms of government” and perversions of those forms. Aristotle explained that “true forms of government…are those in which the one, or the few, or the many , govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are perversions.” (Tilly, 2005:424). He also provided three examples of true forms of government and their perverse forms: Monarchy is the rule of one for the common good and tyranny is the perverse form where the king or dictator seeks his own interest to the detriment to the common interests; Aristocracy is the rule of rich benefactors of society while oligarchy is rule by rich exploiters of their lessers; the final example is Constitutional government is the rule of the masses through established law, again for the common good and the perversion, according to Aristotle, is democracy where the masses live parasitic lives exploiting the rich whom they outnumber and replacing established law with arbitrary decrees. (Tilly, 2005: 424) Another category not included by Aristotle that follow the rule by one, few, or many and perversion based on pursuit of common or contra common interests could be voluntary society, the rule by none with members seeking the mutual benefit of one another through market based exchange, and its perversion lawlessness, a dog eat dog world where each member seeks to gain through the coercion of his neighbors. Even with this fourth category this form of categorization is to simple to capture all of the complexities and subtleties of government types, mechanisms, and their various perversions, nor does it seem to recognize the various degrees of perversion between the “true form” and the perverse form. Also, it does not address the major controversy of discerning what is in the “common interest” or who decides what is in the common interest. There are very few, if any, issues that will have unanimous agreement and so each decision pursuing one goal over another will be against some part of the common, and yet they will be obliged to follow regardless due to the nature of the state as being a monopoly of coercive power over the geographic area they reside in.

 

When applying these categories to modern American government, it is necessary to create another category not mentioned earlier. Aristotle mainly addressed government of direct rule, either by one, few, or many, but America is not ruled directly but through representatives. The power holders are not in the polity, per se, but use proxies to exercise their will. The true form of this government would be representative constitutional government, where the representatives act in the, so called, common interest within strict limits of established law and the perversion is corporatism, where the representatives’ actions are detrimental to the public in order to gain favor or wealth from organized interest groups or from wealthy individuals or businesses. Currently, it would seem that American government is closest to this perverse form, corporatism. The masses have very little political participation, usually limited to a portion voting once every 2-4 years, with not further recourse or actions available to them for the remaining duration of time. However, organized interest groups and wealthy members are able to lobby and influence the polity at will and they find ways to use state coercion against the masses and each other to gain a perceived advantage, as opposed to seeking mutually beneficial means to achieve advantage, though perhaps slower or lesser than what is possible to achieve by exploiting others through the state.

 

The very nature of any state is to move towards its perverse form of government. All of the precautions taken during its formation such as federalism, written constitution, division of powers, etc. are simply recognition of this natural degradation and are meant to act as resistance to slow the inevitable process. The only way for this process to be “reset” is for the government to become intolerable to the people, causing them to revolt and re-establish a new state so that the process can begin again. This again was recognized in the formation of the United States, Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence, “whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government…” The only possible category that can avoid this cycle is that of the voluntary society. So long as all individuals are able to leave and/or form new government-like institutions, then each institution will be forced to act in the common interest since its members will leave, since there is no monopoly or arbitrary exertion of coercion based on geographic boundaries, if the perceived costs of being a “citizen” or member of that institution ever exceed the benefits. All members will be voluntary and their consent to the authority of their chosen institution will be explicit, as opposed to the “implied consent” that existing governments claim to have.

 

Tilly, C. (2005). Regimes and Contention. In T.A. Janoski, A.M. Hicks, & M.A. Schwartz (Eds.), Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization (423-440). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Its been over 2000 years since Aristotle provided his insights into all areas of philosophy, including politics, and yet many of his observations are still useful today. One concept that still has value is that of “true forms of government” and perversions of those forms. Aristotle explained that “true forms of government…are those in which the one, or the few, or the many , govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are perversions.” (Tilly, 2005:424). He also provided three examples of true forms of government and their perverse forms: Monarchy is the rule of one for the common good and tyranny is the perverse form where the king or dictator seeks his own interest to the detriment to the common interests; Aristocracy is the rule of rich benefactors of society while oligarchy is rule by rich exploiters of their lessers; the final example is Constitutional government is the rule of the masses through established law, again for the common good and the perversion, according to Aristotle, is democracy where the masses live parasitic lives exploiting the rich whom they outnumber and replacing established law with arbitrary decrees. (Tilly, 2005: 424) Another category not included by Aristotle that follow the rule by one, few, or many and perversion based on pursuit of common or contra common interests could be voluntary society, the rule by none with members seeking the mutual benefit of one another through market based exchange, and its perversion lawlessness, a dog eat dog world where each member seeks to gain through the coercion of his neighbors. Even with this fourth category this form of categorization is to simple to capture all of the complexities and subtleties of government types, mechanisms, and their various perversions, nor does it seem to recognize the various degrees of perversion between the “true form” and the perverse form. Also, it does not address the major controversy of discerning what is in the “common interest” or who decides what is in the common interest. There are very few, if any, issues that will have unanimous agreement and so each decision pursuing one goal over another will be against some part of the common, and yet they will be obliged to follow regardless due to the nature of the state as being a monopoly of coercive power over the geographic area they reside in.

 

When applying these categories to modern American government, it is necessary to create another category not mentioned earlier. Aristotle mainly addressed government of direct rule, either by one, few, or many, but America is not ruled directly but through representatives. The power holders are not in the polity, per se, but use proxies to exercise their will. The true form of this government would be representative constitutional government, where the representatives act in the, so called, common interest within strict limits of established law and the perversion is corporatism, where the representatives’ actions are detrimental to the public in order to gain favor or wealth from organized interest groups or from wealthy individuals or businesses. Currently, it would seem that American government is closest to this perverse form, corporatism. The masses have very little political participation, usually limited to a portion voting once every 2-4 years, with not further recourse or actions available to them for the remaining duration of time. However, organized interest groups and wealthy members are able to lobby and influence the polity at will and they find ways to use state coercion against the masses and each other to gain a perceived advantage, as opposed to seeking mutually beneficial means to achieve advantage, though perhaps slower or lesser than what is possible to achieve by exploiting others through the state.

 

The very nature of any state is to move towards its perverse form of government. All of the precautions taken during its formation such as federalism, written constitution, division of powers, etc. are simply recognition of this natural degradation and are meant to act as resistance to slow the inevitable process. The only way for this process to be “reset” is for the government to become intolerable to the people, causing them to revolt and re-establish a new state so that the process can begin again. This again was recognized in the formation of the United States, Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence, “whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government…” The only possible category that can avoid this cycle is that of the voluntary society. So long as all individuals are able to leave and/or form new government-like institutions, then each institution will be forced to act in the common interest since its members will leave, since there is no monopoly or arbitrary exertion of coercion based on geographic boundaries, if the perceived costs of being a “citizen” or member of that institution ever exceed the benefits. All members will be voluntary and their consent to the authority of their chosen institution will be explicit, as opposed to the “implied consent” that existing governments claim to have.

 

Tilly, C. (2005). Regimes and Contention. In T.A. Janoski, A.M. Hicks, & M.A. Schwartz (Eds.), Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization (423-440). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Filed under Philosophy, Politics
Apr 6, 2011

Resources of Power: Fear, Love, and Dependency/ Machiavelli’s Prince and Modern Politics

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Throughout chapters XV and XVII of “The Prince” by Machiavelli, it becomes apparent that power is the goal, to include increasing and maintaining power, as opposed to a means to achieve other goals.  Also, it is necessary to view “the prince” as power incarnate, so that what ever benefits the prince benefits the pursuit of power and vice versa.  This helps to make sense of troubling “principles” advocated by Machiavelli, such as the prince “need not make himself uneasy at incurring reproach for those vices without which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.”  (Machiavelli, Chptr. 15)  If power is the only true goal for the prince then it would follow that anything that advanced that goal would be virtuous and that other moral guidelines or cultural views would be moot, and adhering to them would, according to this view, be considered a vice to the degree that they detracted from the goal of increasing or maintaining power.  In chapter XVII of “The Prince”, Machiavelli continues with another principle, that should be troubling for those not in power, that it “is much safer to be feared than loved” since “men loving according to their own will and fearing according to that of the prince” it would be wise for a prince to “establish himself on that which is in his own control” and not rely on that which is in the control of others.  The only limit Machiavelli puts on the prince in regard to using fear to establish his is power, is to “avoid hatred” as that may make “the prince” intolerable and lead to his ouster.

Piven and Cloward, in their essay “Rule Making, Rule Breaking, and Power”, tend to classify power as a means to achieving and individual’s or group’s goals through a series of “zero-sum” contests.  They cite Max Weber’s definition: “power is understood as ‘the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action” (Janoski, 2005, 35) and that of R.H. Tawney: ( power may be defined as the capacity of an individual, or group of individual, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner which he desires, and to prevent his own conduct being modified in the manner in which he does not.” (Janoski, 2005, 35)  Their view of power posits that most, if not all, human interaction involves one dominant party who exploits the dependency of another party, or uses force as their source of power, in order to gain at their expense.  The authors seem to conclude, as a result of this view, that seeking power to exercise over those who have much few resources to exert influence through “social interdependence” is a vice, or social harm and that power should be diffused so that the degree that one party gains at the expense of another party is minimized as much as possible.  However, this is not to say that individuals or groups who did not wish to act socially responsible could not use Machiavelli’s principles to gain power and increase their exploiter status, it just is not the position advocated by Piven and Cloward.

When Machiavelli wrote “The Prince,” it was with monarchy in mind.  The advent of the modern state, new tools and resources of power have been developed and some of the principles found in “The Prince” have become outdated.  However, several tactics advocated by Machiavelli have been modified and carried over to the modern state.  One of the primary differences, though, is that politicians are not power incarnate since they are mere “caretakers” of the state and the expanse of its sovereignty.  Whereas the King was the state, politicians are seen as representatives, sent to enact their constituent’s wills through the state, or as employees of the state.  This “caretaker” position drastically reduces the incentive to seek “absolute power” or power as a goal in and of itself.  Since politicians are only temporarily in power and can not, necessarily, pass power that they gain to their heirs, they are more focused on using resources of power, or “political capital” accumulated by their predecessors or during their temporary terms to achieve more immediate goals that can increase their actual wealth or that of their heirs.  This divergence from the goal of “the Prince” will definitely have an impact on the strategies they pursue, as they will be more short term and consist of utilizing, or spending power, as opposed to building and maintaining it.

The state, itself, is seen as a more ambiguous and anonymous phenomenon that is supposedly created by the “collective consciousness” or “general will” of the people.  However, as Austrian economist, Ludwig von Mises wrote in his book, “Socialism:”

“All rational action is in the first place individual action. Only the individual thinks. Only the individual reasons. Only the individual acts.”
The modern state has achieved the illusion of dichotomy, being divided into one part consisting of some metaphysical representation of the “general will,” the State, and the other of individuals in the employ of the State , and thus theoretically subordinated to the “general will,” politicians and the bureaucracy.  However, as with anything supernatural or based on superstition, closer examination reveals that there is no real evidence of its existence, no actions that can be directly attributed to it, without use of its supposed proxies, no boundaries the demarcate where its existence begins or ends, or any other measure of reality that can be applied to it.  Instead, objective observation, reveals that the masses are still subjected to the coercive power held by a few elite individuals, who when the curtains are pulled back, like in the Wizard of Oz, are normal men acting in their own self-interest.

This illusion of a dichotomous state allows politicians and the bureaucracy to more easily achieve the ideal means to power, according to Machiavelli, fear and love simultaneously.  The ruling elite, presenting themselves as representatives of the masses, can gain the love of the people by advocating for favors on their behalf, while their losses and necessary fear can be attributed to the State.  This phenomenon is apparent in most polls where the American Public, usually, approves of their own Congressman but holds Congress itself in the lowest regard.  They view the system as working against them, and every favor achieved by their representative as being wrestled from the tight jaws of the fearful State on their behalf.  If the public ever realized that the individuals and the State are one and the same the illusion would crumble.

The members of the State are also to achieve both love and fear through dependency, or the threat of withdrawing “love.”  Authoritarian parenting uses this technique to control children.  Children are made to believe that their parents’ love is conditional and can be lost if they do or do not act a certain way.  This method of control tends to be more effective at controlling behavior than fear of corporal punishment or overt reward/punishment schemes.  The State has realized the potential of utilizing this technique on its populations and so attempts to increase dependency and remove competitors of services it provides so that the threat of losing government services has that much more impact on controlling its citizens.  This also fits with Piven and Cloward’s theory of interdependence as a power resource, where the State attempts to raise the dependence of other parties while at the same time reducing its dependence on them so that it can more effectively exploit them with little resistance.

The reason for all the manipulation and illusion to maintain and increase power is because the ruling elite realize that their power truly comes from the people they rule and the legitimacy they grant them and that if the masses realized this, if they are not controlled by sufficient fear or love of the current power holders, they could take that power back at any time.  French philosopher, Etienne de la Boetie, in “The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude”, explained it best:

He who thus domineers over [you]…has indeed nothing more than the power that you confer upon him to destroy you. Where has he acquired enough eyes to spy upon you, if you do not provide them yourselves?  How can he have so many arms to beat you with, if he does not borrow them from you?  The feet that trample down your cities, where does he get them if they are not your own?  How does he have any power over you except through you? How would he dare assail you if had no cooperation from you?…..you weaken yourselves in order to make him the stronger and mightier to hold you in check. (1975, 52)

While Machiavelli’s principles may have been meant for monarchs, the techniques chosen by the modern holders of power should be no less unsettling and if Piven and Cloward are correct that the exercise of power leads to “zero-sum” contests with one party as the exploiter and the other the exploited, then we should recognize that the State is, or strives to be, always the exploiter and we should not give it a pass or make an exception for it in our agreed upon principles and ideas.

Works Cited:
Boetie, E. (1975). The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude. New York: Free Life Editions.
Machiavelli, N. (1916). The Prince. The Macmillan Company.
Mises, L. (1982). Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund Inc.
Piven,F.F., & Cloward, R.A. (2005). Rule Making, Rule Breaking, and Power. In T.A. Janoski, A.M. Hicks, & M.A. Schwartz (Eds.), Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization (33-53). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Filed under Philosophy, Politics
Apr 2, 2011

Corporate Power and Democracy

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Since the American Revolution, Democracy has become the dominant political system in Western and large capitalist societies.  The driving factor is that democratic governments are thought to derive their legitimacy from popular sovereignty, as opposed to divine sovereignty.  However, the states and their people recognized the impracticality of actual direct democracy and opted instead for republicanism, or representative government.  Since this form of governance is still based in popular sovereignty and the theoretical rule “of,” “by,” and “for” the people, it is still often referred to as “democracy.”  As democracy has been observed over time, political scientists have redefined it”as a system whereby elites competed for the votes of a largely passive electorate.”  This position became known as “elite pluralism,” and its success rests on the idea that “as long as one group of elites was without power, its members could appeal to the public to replace the incumbents with those presumably more favorable to their interests.” (Mizruchi and Bey, 2005,311)  Since the success of this type of democracy requires competition, or division, of the elites, many detractors of democracy in capitalist states claim that the elites are, in fact, unified due to “common interests in maintaining their privileges” as well as “common socialization experiences (including attendance at elite prep schools and universities), common membership in social clubs and policy-making organizations, and social and kinship ties.” (Mizruchi and Bey, 2005,311)  Many also believe that these unifying traits are not only shared by the political elites, that are symptomatic of representative democracy, but also in the capitalist class.  If this were to be proved the case, then the elites meet the full requirements for a group to be powerful, “resources and unity,” and would threaten the effectiveness or success of democracy.  The extent that this threat, based on the possible causes and perceived “degree of business unity” the topic of four contemporary theories regarding corporate power and democracy, highlighted by Mark S. Mizruchi and Deborah M. Bey and discussed below. (Mizruchi and Bey, 2005,312)

The “Elite Theory,” by G. William Domhoff, posited “that a power elite, drawn from the social upper class, corporate leaders, and officials of policy-making organizations, collectively dominates American politics,” and that all of the unifying traits mentioned earlier are, in fact, present.  However, despite many revisions and the sophistication in Domhoff’s theories, he points to actions by the state that are opposed by business and those that they advocate as both being in the interest of business, and neither, according to Domhoff, detract from the “view that the elite perpetually dominates” and “thus raises questions about nonfalsifiability” and the overall legitimacy of this theory.(Mizruchi and Bey, 2005, 323)

The next two theories are best understood in the context of the “Berle and Means Thesis,” which basically states that “because of the large and increasing size of corporations, and because of the consequent difficulty of maintaining substantial family holdings in individual firms, stock holdings in large U.S. corporations gradually dispersed.  The consequence of this dispersal…was the usurpation..of power by the firm’s managers.  These managers…were viewed as a self-perpetuating oligarchy, unaccountable to the owners who had elected them.” (Mizruchi and Bey, 2005, 312)  With this in mind, Michael Useem, found that since the “largest single block of stockholders by the 1990s was not individuals,…but institutional investors,” they were the dominant power holders in business.(Mizruchi and Bey, 2005, 324)  Useem, however, made no claim to their unity and so his theory mostly contradicts that the managers are unaccountable, at least in recent decades, due to the influence of institutional investors.  The third theory, proposed by Gerald Davis, also attempts to negate the Berle and Means thesis by claiming that it makes no difference if a corporation is owner or manager run since they both must conform to “pressure from an amorphous, but no less real, source,” the “capital market.” (Mizruchi and Bey, 2005, 324-325)  The elites are “compelled to vow allegiance to ‘shareholder value'” and their “structures and policies are driven by anticipations of their economic consequences.” (Mizruchi and Bey, 2005, 325)  However, while Davis tries to use this observation to show a unity of purpose and political domination by the anonymous members of the “capital market,” but the very nature of this group, where no individuals, elite or otherwise, or their interests can be specified indicates that Davis’s theory simply creates a generalization so broad that almost anyone could be a part of it.  If that is the case, then the dispersal and division of interests that would exist in the “capital market” would actually be a boon to democracy if they were the truly the dominating force.

The fourth theory is conceptually different than the previous theories due to its international scale.  “Several scholars have suggested that with the increasing globalization of economic activity” and “the extent to which corporations have the ability to move capital outside their borders” giving “them leverage over their host states…national governments have lost the ability to regulate their own business communities.” (Mizruchi and Bey, 2005, 329)  This would certainly appear to diminish the power of national governments, but it does not necessarily mean an increase in corporate power, or the general business community, since that would still require unity in effort, which faces all of the difficulties present in the earlier theories.

I would like to close with my theory on corporate power and politics.  The first part explains why corporate interests seem to be advanced, overall, in spite of real conflicting interests within the corporate community. The state holds a monopoly over “legal” coercion and this is its only real service it has to offer on the marketplace.  The “passive electorate” is not as concerned, or as dependent a customer, of government coercion; whereas, corporations are interested in using state coercion to prevent or reduce competition and to advance its interests.  So overall, the government responds to the market for coercion, acting in the interests of various corporate entities who are most able to afford it, in means of resources and influence to protect the political elites’ privileges.  This does not require unity from the various corporate interests and the inconsistency of the policies enforced through state coercion seem to support that there is no need for unity from the corporate community in order for the state to act generally in their favor.  This on its own is destructive to society and damaging to the democratic ideal but does not cause a complete collapse of they system because of the lack of unity.  However, this trend may very likely lead to the second part of this theory which will lead to the collapse of democracy.  As the state continues to use coercion to choose the “winners” and “losers”, whether among the corporate community or between the corporate community and the rest of the electorate, there will be fewer and fewer parties competing or seeking the state’s coercive service.  Common sense dictates that it is easier for a few to coalesce, than the many, and so this increased centralization of both political and corporate elites will make it much more likely that complete unity, and the destruction of democracy will occur.

Mizruchi, M.S., & Bey, D.M. (2005). Rule Making, Rule Breaking, and Power. In T.A. Janoski, A.M. Hicks, & M.A. Schwartz (Eds.), Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization (310-330). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Mar 30, 2011

Nationalism and Democracy: The Unintended Consequence of Decivilizaiton

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Below is a response I posted in one of my classes:

The Treaty of Westphalia and the American Revolution marked another shift as well that is directly tied to the concept of Nationalism and can help explain the problems that the critics associate with it: “war, poverty, exploitation, colonialism, terrorism” and crime.  They marked the shift from monarchical government, where the legitimacy of power was gained through divine sovereignty, to democratic government, where the legitimacy comes from popular sovereignty.  Both forms require a monopoly on coercion over a geographic area, but the irony is that the form of government that appears more benevolent and fair-minded to its subjects, democracy, is actually equally or even more damaging to the societies who live under them.  The reason being that monarchs were seen as coercive and a burden on their subjects and thus much more susceptible to revolution; whereas, democracy takes “privileges, discrimination, and protectionism” that was once restricted to “princes and nobles” and opens them up to “be exercised and accorded to everyone.” (Hoppe, 2007, 83)  Nationalism is then the concept of identifying with the State, making one inseparable from it.  The groups in the text still apply here as each type: “individualistic and civic”, “collectivist and civic”, and collectivist and ethnic” (Greenfield & Eastwood, 2005, 256) describe who the privileges etc. can be accorded to and who will identify with the state, practice nationalism.  It follows then that any attack on the state will be viewed by each respective group as an attack on their perceived current or potential power and so resistance will be prevented or crushed in a decentralized manner through the nationalistic groups, protecting and adding legitimacy to the central government.

Nationalism and war: Total war,war on the entire population of a state vs war between just the militaries, is the result of all of the citizenry, or the various groups depending on the type of nationalism, identifying with the state.  In the age of monarchies, conflicts were “merely violent dynastic property disputes,” that could be “resolved through acts of territorial occupation;” however, modern wars have “become battles between different ways of life, which can only be resolved through cultural, linguistic, or religious domination and subjugation (or extermination).” (Hoppe, 2007, 37)  When there is no way to separate the populations from the state, due to nationalism, the wars have to be between the populations.

Nationalism and terrorism: Unlike the text, it does not appear to me that terrorism is the tactic used by people who subscribe to nationalism, but the tactic of those who do not identify with a state to use against those who subscribe to nationalism.  Those who use terrorist tactics see the citizenry as inseparable from the state and as the source of power and legitimacy for the state whose course they wish to change. This leads them to believe that tactical influence and victory can be gained by attacking this source of power, the citizenry, as opposed to attacking the State directly.

Nationalism and Exploitation/colonialism: Since the citizenry identify with the State and entry into positions of power are available to the citizenry, “everyone is permitted to openly express his desire for other men’s property.” (Hoppe, 2007, 87)  This can be through advocating redistributional policies within the population (exploitation) or through advocating territorial expansion in order to take property from outside the population (colonialism) and will be supported by the majority who see the gains of the State as their gains, or due to their hope to eventually enter into a position of power themselves and have the property available to achieve their own ends.

Nationalism and poverty/crime: The more general and damaging effect of nationalism is that it creates a higher time preference (in economics higher time preference refers wanting things sooner; a more short term outlook for both goals and consequences).  This is due to the uncertainty caused by mass amounts of legislation and regulation that results from the increased legitimacy granted to States of nationalistic populations and from the disincentive to accumulate capital due to increased exploitation/property redistribution that occurs for reasons mentioned above.  The resulting decivilization caused by higher time preference is a complex process to explain here but I will use the conclusion from the Chapter, “On Time Preference, Government, and the Process of Decivilization” from Hoppe’s “Democracy: The God that Failed” to sum up the effects:

“…as far as government is concerned, democratic republicanism [nationalism] produced communism (and with this public slavery and government sponsored mass murder even in peacetime), fascism, national socialism and, lastly and most enduringly, social democracy (‘liberalism’).  Compulsory military service has become almost universal, foreign and civil wars have increased in frequency and in brutality, and in the process of political centralization has advanced further than ever.  Internally, democratic republicanism [nationalism] has led to permanently rising taxes, debts, and public employment.  It has led to the destruction of the gold standard, unparalleled paper-money inflation, and increased protectionism and migration controls.  Even the most fundamental private law provision have been perverted by an unabating flood of legislation and regulation.    Simultaneously, as regards civil society, the institutions of marriage and family have been increasingly weakened, the number of children has declined, and the rates of divorce, illegitimacy, single parenthood, singledom, and abortion have increased.  Rather than rising with rising incomes, savings rates have been stagnating or even falling…And the rates of crime, structural unemployment, welfare dependency, parasitism, negligence, recklessness, incivility, psychopathy, and hedonism have increased.” (Hoppe, 2007, 42-43)

Greenfield, L. & Eastwood, J.(2005). Rule Making, Rule Breaking, and Power. In T.A. Janoski, A.M. Hicks, & M.A. Schwartz (Eds.), Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization (33-53). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Hoppes, H.H. (2007) Democracy: The God that Failed.New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Mar 26, 2011